Whether Mutuality of Obligation Exists in a Contract is to be Determined by Arbitrators by unknown
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
WHETHER MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION EXISTS IN A
CONTRACT IS TO BE DETERMINED BY
ARBITRATORS
Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta
9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463 (1961)
In 1955, Exercycle Corporation hired James Maratta as its vice presi-
dent in charge of sales. The employment agreement provided that, "Any
dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be settled
by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association." In 1960, after a difference of opinion, Maratta wrote the
owner of the corporation that he had "started" to seek employment else-
where; the owner treated the letter as one of resignation. Maratta then
sought arbitration. Exercycle brought a proceeding for a stay of the arbitra-
tion on the ground that the contract of employment was void because it
lacked mutuality. The motion for a stay was denied by the court, and the
decision was affirmed by the appellate division' on the ground that the con-
tract was valid. The court of appeals affirmed for a different reason,2 i.e.,
the question of the contract's validity was to be decided by the arbitrators
and not the court.3 The court felt that the arbitrators should decide any dis-
pute between the parties which was within the arbitration clause.
In cases involving arbitration clauses as broad as the one used in the
present case, the New York courts have held that there must be a valid
contract between the parties before the court will recognize jurisdiction
in the arbitrators.4 If the contract is challenged because one of the parties
alleges fraud,5 illegality 6 or claims that there was no acceptance of the
offer 7 a court will decide the issue.8 But when the dispute relates to
1 11 App. Div. 2d 677, 201 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1960).
2 Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463 (1961).
3 The two justices concurred with the majority saying that the issue of mutuality
of obligation was to be decided by the court. They felt the contract was not illusory,
and the arbitrators could decide the question of cancellation. One justice dissented; he
felt that the court should determine the question of mutuality of obligation. However,
he felt the contract was illusory.
4 Finsilver, Still & Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579
(1930); In the Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 17, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957);
In the Matter of Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942); In the Matter of Berko-
vitz, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
5 In the Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp., supra note 4; In the Matter of Lipman,
supra note 4; Application of Gruen, 173 Misc. 765, 18 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
aff'd, 259 App. Div. 712, 18 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1940).
6 In the Matter of Metro Plan v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.Y.S.2d 35
(1939); Abbey v. Meyerson, 274 App. Div. 389, 83 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd,
299 N.Y. 557, 85 N.E.2d 889 (1949).
7 Finsilver, Still & Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., supra note 4.
8 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1444 (1951). "Suppose, however, that the agreement to
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performance, the issue is to be settled by arbitration,9 unless the controversy
is frivolous' ° or performance is prohibited by statute." The court in the
principal case, however, seems to have departed from the heretofore pre-
vailing rule that the courts and not the arbitrators determine the validity
of the contract. It is settled that the arbitrators are not bound by substan-
tive rules of law, procedure, or evidence, 12 and their awards cannot be
reversed because of errors of law.1 3 Consequently, if the arbitrators decide
the validity of the contract upon which their own jurisdiction depends,
a party may be denied trial by jury on the issue of whether or not he
entered into a contract.
If the courts are to decide all issues as to the contract's validity,
an objecting party can hinder and delay arbitration by interposing defenses
to the contract. This would frustrate and delay arbitration, and a primary
purpose of arbitration is to give the parties an expeditious way to settle
their disputes.14 One solution is to treat the contract and the arbitration
provision as separate and let the court determine the validity of only the
latter.15 The New York Arbitration Statute'0 provides that the court is to
decide issues relating to the making of the contract.17 But is this provision
referring to the contract or the arbitration clause? If one reads this section
in light of the preceding section of the statute where the term "contract"
is described,18 it would seem that the statute is referring only to the
arbitrate disputes is a component part of the very bargaining transaction that is now
asserted to be void for want of mutual assent .... It would seem that if the alleged
defect exists, it affects the provision for arbitration just as much as it affects the other
provisions.... In cases within this paragraph, the remedies for enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements are not available, including the enforcing order, authorized by an arbi-
tration statute. Before issuing such an order the court must know that a legal duty to
arbitrate exists; this is an issue that the court itself must decide." See also 6 Williston,
Contracts § 1920 (1936).
9 In Re Kahn's Application, 284 N.Y. 515, 32 N.E.2d 534 (1940); In the Matter
of Wenger & Co., 239 N.Y. 199, 146 N.E. 203 (1924).
10 Albert v. Admiration Knitwear Co., 304 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E.2d 561 (1952); In the
Matter of General Electric Co., 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E.2d 181 (1949); In the Matter of
Wenger & Co., supra note 9.
11 In the Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle Co., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493 (1942).
12 Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1875).
13 In the Matter of Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
14 Parsell, "Arbirtation of Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract," 12 Cornell L.Q.
351 (1927).
15 Sturges, "Fraudulent Inducement as a Defense to the Enforcement of Arbitration
Contracts," 36 Yale LJ. 866 (1927).
16 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1450 (1937).
17 Ibid. "If evidentiary facts be set forth raising a substantial issue as to the
making of the contract . . .the court ... shall proceed immediately to the trial thereof
if the court . . . find(s) that a written contract providing for arbitration was
made .. . the parties shall proceed with the arbitration . .. if the court .. .find(s)
that there was not such contract . . . then the proceedings shall be dismissed."
18 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 (1937). "Two or more persons . . . may con-
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arbitration provision.' 9 With this interpretation, it appears the court
would try only those issues relating to the validity of the making of the
arbitration clause and not the main contract.20 Once the arbitration clause
is held valid, all other issues raised by the parties which are within the
arbitration clause would be decided by the arbitrators. However, the
New York courts in the past have interpreted "contract" in this section
to mean the main contract. 2 '
Although one might justify the novel position of the court of appeals
in the instant case on the theory that the arbitration clause is an agreement
separate from the contract itself, the court did not proceed on that basis 2
It reasoned that a question of mutuality of obligation depends "primarily
on a reading and construction of the agreement" and "involves substantial
difficulties of interpretation" 23 which could best be decided by the arbitra-
tors, even though, in this case, it involved a question of the contract's
validity. The court did not overrule the cases cited above 4 which held that
the validity of the contract is generally a matter reserved for judicial
decision. However, since lack of mutuality affects validity, the present
decision seems inconsistent with the earlier ones. It is therefore doubtful
whether the earlier cases still have any value as precedents.
Moreover, the cases relied on by the majority do not support the
result in the present case. In those cases the controversy involved develop-
ments which occurred subsequent to the making of the contract; such
issues were, obviously, for the arbitrators to decide. 25 In The Matter of
tract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them and such
... contract shall be valid . . ..
19 See Sturges, supra note 15 at 872, to the effect that the New York Arbitration
Statute "should be held to make written arbitration contracts or provisions severable
from the general bargain which they may accompany . . .and out of which disputes
may arise to be arbitrated ... 2' Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum). The mutual promises to arbitrate would form the
quid pro quo which is necessary to sever the agreement from the main contract.
20 In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., supra note 19, the Court
found a valid agreement to arbitrate and stated that the issue of fraud in the inducement
on the main contract was to be decided by the arbitrators. The court deduced separate
contracts by construing the word "contract" in the Federal Arbitration Act [9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1958)] to refer only to the agreement to arbitrate.
21 See cases in supra note 4; 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1444 (1951). The New
York courts have felt that the arbitration provision is collateral to the main contract;
therefore a denial of the validity of the main contract necessarily denies the validity
of the arbitration provision.
22 See the concurring opinion of judge Froessel in Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta,
supra note 2.
23 B3ut see, In the Matter of Grean & Co., 274 App. Div. 279, 82 N.Y.S.2d 787
(Sup. Ct. 1948), which also involved the question of mutuality of obligation in an
employment contract. Here the court determined the validity of the contract.
24 See cases cited in supra notes 4, 5, 6, and 7.
25 In the Matter of Terminal Auxiliar Maritima v. Winkler Cr. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d
294, 160 N.E.2d 526 (1959); Paloma Frocks v. Shamokin Sports Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 575,
147 N.E.2d 779 (1958); In the Matter of Lipman, supra note 4; Marchant v. Mead-
1962]
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Lipman,26 the appellant argued that the issue of cancellation of the
contract was to be determined by the court. The court held for the
appellee and said: 27
A different question would be here if the issue was whether
the contract never came into existence and hence was void, or if,
although the contract was made, there arose an issue of fraud,
duress, or other impediment which rendered the contract voidable,
or if there were any conditions precedent.
The provision for arbitration in the Lipman case was as broad as the pro-
vision in the principal case.28 The Lipman case, accordingly, supports the
dissenting opinion of the principal case.2 9
Although the majority opinion is without case-support, the decision
seems correct. When parties execute a contract to arbitrate and include
a broad arbitration clause such as in the principal case, they seemingly
intend to arbitrate any and all issues including the making and execution of
the contract. Although these issues are not decided by substantive rules
of law, the parties are not prejudiced because they have agreed that the
arbitrators shall decide all controversies arising out of the agreement,
thus waiving trial by jury. Parties choose to arbitrate because they want
to obtain prompt decisions; hence, they regard the arbitral process as more
efficient than judicial proceedings. Furthermore, arbitrators are as compe-
tent to decide the issue of validity as any other issue which does not involve
difficult problems of public policy.30 Therefore, the courts should limit
themselves to determining only whether the parties have made a binding
agreement to arbitrate.
The issue of whether the court or the arbitrators should determine
the validity of the main contract has not yet been presented to an Ohio
court. In the Ohio Arbitration Act,31 however, the ambiguous word
"contract" found in the New York Civil Practice Act is replaced by the
words "agreement for arbitration." This wording of the Ohio statute seems
to require explicitly that the arbitration agreement be considered as separate
from the main contract. Therefore, it would seem that in Ohio the
arbitrators should determine the validity of the main contract if the
arbitration clause is as broad as in the principal case.
Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929); In re Kelly, 240 N.Y. 74, 147
NX. 363 (1925).
26 In the Matter of Lipman, supra note 4.
27 Id. at 79, 43 N.E.2d 818, 819.
28 Id. at 80, 43 N.E.2d 819. ". . . the language of the provision providing for
arbitration uses not only the phrase 'any and all controversies arising out of the contract'
but also 'any and all controversies in connection with the contract,' this language would
appear sufficiently broad to express the intention of parties to include within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the arbitrators as a general rule all acts by the parties giving rise
to issues in relation to the contract, except the making thereof."
29 Supra note 3.
30 Sturges, supra note 15, at 73.
31 The Ohio Arbitration Act can be found in the Ohio Rev. Code § 2711, et seq.;
see particularly sections 2711.01 and 2711.03.
